North Korea To Attack the South?, Israel and "Genocide", Post-Orban Hungary and Sovereignty, US Machine Tools Industry Decline, Ellis Island and "Name Changes"
Every weekend (almost) I share five articles/essays/reports with you. I select these over the course of the week because they are either insightful, informative, interesting, important, or a combination of the above.
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Some Israelis like to fancy their country as a “modern-day Sparta”, but I think that this description best fits the DPRK (North Korea), the world’s only present-day totalitarian regime.
All of you reading this have had the accompaniment of the threat of war between the North and South of Korea throughout your entire lives. It’s been a permanent fixture for us, which allows us to brush aside the threat of it ever happening. The last serious fighting between the two sides ended in 1953 with an armistice that has held ever since. That’s an entire lifetime ago.
For those of us in the West, the Kim Dynasty that has ruled the North with the proverbial iron fist has been an object of scorn and mockery. The present chief, Kim Jong Un, is just as prone to belligerent outbursts as his father, and his grandfather who preceded him. This outbursts are generally treated as regular, minor seismic tremors from a volcano that has been dormant for some time now. To us, North Korea is a country that is vastly underdeveloped and on the permanent cusp of mass starvation. All of you have seen this image that shows just how far behind the North is from the South:
On the other hand, the DPRK is a highly-militarized state with a core mission to reunite with South Korea (ROK) one way or another. ROK is backed by a significant US military presence and an alliance of sorts with Japan courtesy of Washington’s dominant role in the region (Koreans do not like the Japanese at all, but beggars cannot be choosers). The DPRK is sending millions of shells to Russia in order to fill its depleting stocks. They are armed to the teeth, and not just conventionally. Siegfried Hecker and ex-State Department official Robert Carlin are sounding the alarm that the DPRK might be getting ready to launch a serious attack on ROK in the near future:
We do not know when or how Kim plans to pull the trigger, but the danger is already far beyond the routine warnings in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about Pyongyang’s “provocations.” In other words, we do not see the war preparation themes in North Korean media appearing since the beginning of last year as typical bluster from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).
What usually happens is that the DPRK will issue bellicose threats to ROK and the USA, and then lob a bunch of artillery shells at an uninhabited island in the possession of ROK, declaring a “great triumph”, prompting a new round of propaganda for its domestic audience. The authors here feel that something is different this time:
Typically, it will be met with the by-now routine argument that Kim Jong Un would not dare take such a step because he “knows” Washington and Seoul would destroy his regime if he does so. If this is what policymakers are thinking, it is the result of a fundamental misreading of Kim’s view of history and a grievous failure of imagination that could be leading (on both Kim’s and Washington’s parts) to a disaster.
A change in policy:
Without grasping in detail what, why, and how North Korean policy retained its central goal of normalizing relations with the United States from 1990 until 2019, there is no way to understand the profound change that has taken place in Pyongyang’s thinking since then. This bedrock policy shift by Kim to gird for a war would only come after he concluded all other options had been exhausted, and that the previous strategy shaping North Korean policy since 1990 had irrevocably failed.
Some context:
Beginning with the crucial, strategic decision by Kim Il Sung in 1990, the North pursued a policy centered on the goal of normalizing relations with the United States as a buffer against China and Russia. After initial movement in that direction with the 1994 Agreed Framework and six years of implementation, the prospects for success diminished when—in Pyongyang’s eyes—successive US administrations pulled away from engagement and largely ignored North Korean initiatives. Even after the Agreed Framework fell apart in 2002, the North tried to pull the US back into serious talks by giving unprecedented access to the nuclear center at Yongbyon to one of us (Hecker). During the Barack Obama Administration, the North made several attempts that Washington not only failed to probe but, in one case, rejected out of hand. There is much debate in the United States whether the North was ever serious, and whether dialogue was simply a cover for developing nuclear weapons.
Occam’s Razor suggests that the DPRK was indeed playing for time in order to develop its nuclear weapons program. After all, they saw what happened to states who gave up their programs (think: Libya).
The failure of the ‘normalization’ policy:
The second part of the answer as to why the current danger is being missed is the failure to fully understand how the failed February 2019 Hanoi summit affected Kim Jong Un’s views, and how over the next two years the North reexamined its policy options. The June 2018 Singapore summit with President Donald Trump was to Kim the realization of what his grandfather had envisioned, and his father had attempted but never attained—normalization of relations with the United States. Kim poured his prestige into the second summit in Hanoi. When that failed, it was a traumatic loss of face for Kim. His final letter to President Trump in August 2019 reflects how much Kim felt he had risked and lost.
The shift:
The first obvious signs that a decision had been made and a decisive break with the past was underway came in the summer and autumn of 2021, apparently the result of a reevaluation in Pyongyang of shifts in the international landscape and signs—at least to the North Koreans—that the United States was in global retreat. This shift in perspective provided the foundation for a grand realignment in the North’s approach, a strategic reorientation toward China and Russia that was already well underway by the time of the Putin–Xi summit of February 2022 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There are few signs that relations with China have moved very far, and, in fact, signs of real cooling in China-DPRK relations. However, ties with Russia developed steadily, especially in the military area, as underscored by the visit of the Russian Defense Minister in July and the Putin–Kim summit in the Russian Far East last September.
“….that the United States was in global retreat.” Keep this bit in mind.
At the start of 2023, the war preparations theme started appearing regularly in high-level North Korean pronouncements for domestic consumption. At one point, Kim Jong Un even resurrected language calling for “preparations for a revolutionary war for accomplishing…reunification.” Along with that, in March, authoritative articles in the party daily signaled a fundamentally and dangerously new approach to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), introducing formulations putting South Korea beyond the pale, outside what could be considered the true Korea, and thus, as a legitimate target for the North’s military might. At the plenum last month, Kim made that shift crystal clear, declaring that “north-south relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogenous ones any more.”
A final warning:
North Korea has a large nuclear arsenal, by our estimate of potentially 50 or 60 warheads deliverable on missiles that can reach all of South Korea, virtually all of Japan (including Okinawa) and Guam. If, as we suspect, Kim has convinced himself that after decades of trying, there is no way to engage the United States, his recent words and actions point toward the prospects of a military solution using that arsenal.
If that comes to pass, even an eventual US-ROK victory in the ensuing war will be empty. The wreckage, boundless and bare, will stretch as far as the eye can see.
Is this another case of Peter crying “wolf”? Quite possibly.
On the other hand, I have to think of all the possibilities. Might there be a secret plan in which Russia, Iran (and its proxies), Venezuela, North Korea, and China are gradually raising the global temperature to stretch out US forces and pull it in several directions so that the ground can be laid for China to invade Taiwan and deal a crippling strike to US power and prestige?
Recently, South Africa brought a case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Netherlands, in which it accuses Israel of engaging in genocide against Palestinians. The court has heard these arguments, and will need to decide whether to accept the case, and, if so, how it could proceed to try the State of Israel and its leading figures.
Genocide is the ultimate charge in the world of war crimes, the nuclear option. A state in which officials are convicted of genocide is seen to have lost all legitimacy regarding its right to exist. At the same time, proving genocide is an incredibly difficult task. Even Adolf Eichmann wasn’t convicted of genocide, and was instead found guilty of crimes against humanity. The first actual successful conviction of an individual charged with genocide in an international tribunal was that of Jean-Paul Akayesu, a mayor of a town in Rwanda. After him came more Hutus from Rwanda, and 10 Bosnian Serbs.
Taking a step back, my thoughts right now are that these charges might be being used by Russia (and China) in order to harm the legitimacy of the ICC/ICJ, a court where the Americans and Brits seek to try Putin and his colleagues for genocide and other war crimes. The Russians are fully aware that the Americans will never let the Israelis be put on trial at The Hague for war crimes. This refusal would shake the legitimacy of that court and of international law overall, and it would render the case against Russia partisan, ridiculous, and therefore unjustified.
At present, the Americans, Brits, French, Canadians, and Germans have all publicly sided with Israel regarding the South African case brought against it. The Germans have gone as far as to state that they will ‘actively’ support the Israelis on this front should it even go beyond this point. You will note that I am not stating what I think of the charges against Israel. I will save that for another time. In the meantime, I will share with you an opinion piece by an ex-US State Department official who is both Jewish and resides in Israel. This piece is very slanted, so ‘buyer beware’. I chose this article because I had to choose one, and its high bias renders it useless for a future piece on war crimes and international law that I am considering putting together:
Under the terms of the Genocide Convention, passed by the United Nations in 1948, states can be called upon “to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide”. In other words, designating something as genocide brings with it a duty to act — and it is the fear of that duty that paradoxically encourages responsible states to desist from using the term and thus draw on its moral and mobilising force. That is why the US took 40 years to ratify the Genocide Convention and has been so hesitant to invoke it long after it did. When I served in the US State Department we deployed an ensemble of verbal acrobatics — “acts tantamount to genocide”, “acts constituting genocide”, “acts of a genocidal nature” — rather than plain old “genocide”, since we knew what it entailed.
Like I said, a “nuclear bomb” of a charge.
Fortunately, we have a branch of international law to help guide us in wartime: International Humanitarian Law, including the Laws of Armed Conflict. Here, Israel has laid out its understandings of that body of law as it pertains to this conflict, and its interpretations. Those interpretations are of course open to criticism, particularly around the issue of “proportionality”, as any warfighting might be. But that requires attending to the actual facts on the ground; and that is precisely what South Africa’s presentation last week at the Hague deliberately did not do.
As Itamar Mann, a well-respected Israeli scholar, himself strongly critical of the present war, has carefully pointed out, precisely because South Africa itself is not a party to the conflict, it was perfectly positioned to lay out a more complex picture of the facts than it did. By acknowledging, for instance, Hamas’s deliberate shelling of Israeli civilians since October 7, and subsequent warfighting from its tunnels, it could have presented a much stronger case.
South Africa, of course, had reasons of its own for presenting the case as it did. It is, after all, attempting to position itself as a leader of the blocs of countries increasingly challenging the already-tottering US-led world order. But even so, pressing a case of genocide still requires proving two elements of the crime: genocidal intent and genocidal actions.
Genocidal intent and genocidal actions.
South Africa was able to present evidence of genocidal-sounding intent from any number of political actors in the Netanyahu government. None of them, though, have direct decision-making authority over the conduct of the war, leading to open hostility between some of them (Itamar Ben-Gvir above all) with the IDF high command. That direct authority is reserved not just to the military professionals, but to the war cabinet……
Israel has been very, very sloppy regarding communications discipline, as the author alludes to above. There have been some very edgy statements coming not just from IDF soldiers on the ground, but also from high-ranking politicians. Very irresponsible behaviour.
This:
Moreover, if genocide were Israel’s aim, issuing warnings before bombings, creating humanitarian corridors (however limited), and allowing in food and other necessities would be a pretty poor way of going about it.
He has a point….but this point does not spare Israel from charges of war crimes other than genocide, based on the criteria established at the ICTY (the war crimes tribunal for the wars in the ex-YU). I can ream off a list of war crimes charges that the IDF and Netanyahu’s cabinet could face based on their performance and actions in the Gaza Strip, if the criteria from the ICTY was applied to this conflict.
The greatest fear:
Which brings us back to last week’s activities in the Hague. Israel, too, emerged in 1948 in the aftermath of monumental genocide, and the circumstances of its birth are joined to the concept of genocide at the root. If it practises genocide, one might conclude that it therefore forfeits its “right to exist”. Indeed, Israel appears to be the only country regularly talked of in terms of having, or not having, “a right to exist”.
There is no doubt that a large segment of the world seeks the eradication of the State of Israel, and lawfare is one weapon in their arsenal.
One last bit:
And nothing at all — in that there is no attempt in these proceedings to ease the very real suffering of Palestinians on the ground from all that Hamas has brought upon them on its own, and by bringing down upon them the full force of Israel; and no attempt to convey to moderate Israelis that there actually is an international community trying to use international law to end conflicts rather than carry them on by other means.
This last argument is a sound one to me. Opponents of Israel will reply by saying “they should change their behaviour”.
The events in Poland show that it is very dangerous for conservatives and nationalists in Europe to lose even one single election. With the full backing of Brussels and Washington, the new Polish government is speedrunning Poland’s “Americanization”, tying it to all sorts of international conventions that are very difficult to undo, and taking a sledgehammer to all the ramparts of Polish conservatism in order to do so.
Centrist liberals and leftists in Europe can afford to lose elections from time to time. This is a luxury that they possess. The question for European conservatives and nationalists is: how to act in times when you are not in government? Viktor Orban and his ruling Fidesz party have tackled this question, and their answer is that institutions, both political and cultural, that share their views must be erected and must be robust enough to serve as challenges to liberal and left-wing regimes. Much like how liberals and the left have their powerful NGO sector, popular culture, academia, etc., right wingers need the same in order to be able to effectively challenge power when not in charge of the state.
Matija Stahan suggests that we take a look at Croatia and the experience of its first President, Franjo Tudjman, to understand what is in store for at post-Fidesz Hungary:
During his first term as prime minister of Hungary, from 1998-2002, Viktor Orbán delivered a eulogy for Franjo Tuđman, the first president of Croatia (1990-1999). In his remarks, Orbán noted that “Central Europe remains without a leader. That region cannot be as stable as it is now without President Tuđman. We need to continue on his path and build on his work.” Orbán’s words were not an empty courtesy; if anything, they were a prophecy. After he returned to power in 2010, the Western media portrayed him in the same way that they had portrayed the Croatian president: an autocratic ruler opposed to the liberal norms of the modern West.
Despite the media’s false characterization of the two, it is undeniable that there is a marked similarity in their political lives. In his day, Tuđman was a charismatic leader who prized the nation over the ‘global community.’ Like Tuđman, Orbán has been fighting for the interests of his country since he entered into politics, and despite pressure from Western powers, which deny the importance of national traditions and insist that people can be transplanted from one cultural context to another without consequences.
Stahan notes the many similarities between Tudjman and Orban:
The two leaders’ biographies are, of course, very different. Orbán was born after the Second World War; Tuđman participated in it. Despite this, Orbán’s life has had a very similar trajectory to Tuđman’s. Both of them had a political conversion. Tuđman began as a communist who helped build Yugoslavia, and ended as a Croatian nationalist who overthrew it. Orbán began his political career as a liberal and the recipient of donations from George Soros; he is now known as the founder of an ‘illiberal democracy’ and is one of the loudest critics of Soros’ financial and political activities. In the Second World War, Tuđman fought on the side of Tito’s partisans and later became the youngest Yugoslav general. He left the army to do historiography and fell out of favor with the communist authorities by questioning the foundational Yugoslav myths about the collective guilt of the Croatian people for WWII war crimes. In the 1960s, he was expelled from the Communist Party, and in the ’70s and ’80s, he was temporarily imprisoned for speaking out about Croatian inequality in Yugoslavia.
As a forerunner of contemporary sovereigntist movements on the European Right, Tuđman was guided by a clear principle: Croatia can cooperate with other countries—in fact, Zagreb’s goal was to join the Euro-Atlantic integrations—but it is completely unacceptable for other countries to dictate Croatia’s policy. Orbán is guided by a similar principle. Hungary will remain a member of the EU, but a member that is independent of the will of European bureaucrats who seek to impose ideological experiments on the Hungarian people.
National sovereignty over globalism and supra-national bureaucracies. Tudjman was derided during his time as a “man of 19th century ideas” due to his insistence on national sovereignty, much like how Orban is derided today for the same reason. Western liberals made the categorical error in 1989 when they assumed that the peoples of the former communist countries of Europe sought individual liberty, when the fact of the matter is that most of them sought national liberation instead. This fundamental error still colours much of the disputes between Brussels and Budapest, Warsaw, Bratislava, and so on.
In contrast to globalist and multicultural values, Tuđman committed his nation to upholding traditional values and the ethical heritage of Christianity. He would not agree to the ideologies imposed on Croatia, despite the powerful political activities of foreign financiers and NGOs, especially in transitional post-communist countries. George Soros and his Open Society Foundation are prominent examples of organizations that seek to undermine national character and culture.
Tudjman went as far as to declare Soros persona non grata, as he was the billionaire’s first target (alongside Slovakia’s Meciar) for regime change via ‘colour revolution’. Tudjman defeated Soros, but only in the short term. Dying in 1999 at the age of 77, Croatia quickly succumbed to the designs of Soros and the US State Department:
Although he failed to remove Tuđman from power, Soros nevertheless symbolically won in Croatia. The changes for which Soros advocated were required by the cultural and political trends of the West, which were also connected to Croatia’s approach to Euro-Atlantic integration. Paradoxically, even Tuđman himself is largely to blame for Soros’ symbolic victory. This is because, in order to win and retain power, and perhaps as a way to defend his own communist past, Tuđman did not initiate a clear break with the Yugoslav communist elites, but rather allowed many influential communist politicians to retain their power in independent Croatia. After his death, that decision undermined his legacy. The former communists merged their Yugoslav “multiculturalism” with the current, globalist regime.
The former communists of Eastern Europe were the quickest to adapt to the New World Order, and were opportunistic enough to adopt western liberal democracy as their new philosophy, despite being communist authoritarians the day before.1
“De-Tudjmanization” and the threat to Hungary:
Tuđman’s successors, often unrepentant former communists, engaged in numerous compromises with power centers outside Croatia. Sometimes these negotiations bordered on high treason—as in the case of the handing over of classified documents from Tuđman’s office to the Hague Tribunal during the mandate of his successor Stjepan Mesić. Croatian telecommunications, banks, the food industry, and the media (even the state oil company, the majority of which was sold to Hungary) were largely left to foreigners. This had less to do with ‘market laws’ and more to do with the strategic positioning of foreign political and economic interests in Croatia and the servile policies of Tuđman’s successors. The postulates of globalism were woven into Croatian media, politics, and culture. After Tuđman’s death, communist myths were resurrected, and the feeling of patriotic enthusiasm in the people inspired by the war of independence was very quickly exposed to media scorn and stigmatization. In short, Croatia’s political parties, including the post-Tuđman HDZ, have undergone a ‘de-Tuđmanization.’
In light of these historical events, it is important to recognize that, after Orbán steps down from power, Hungary could pass through a similar ‘de-Orbánization.’ This could happen if globalist actors use Orbán’s shortcomings—which are similar to Tuđman’s and are largely conditioned by the contextual similarity of their ruling positions. These shortcomings were not the main cause of ‘de-Tuđmanization,’ nor would they be of the potential ‘de-Orbánization.’ However, they provide an excuse for the implementation of policies crafted by foreign power centers, which political opposition will embrace as a means of seizing power themselves.
One of these easily exploited shortcomings is that, like Tuđman, Orbán has created a circle of politicians and entrepreneurs who have become co-managers of the state. Like his Croatian predecessor, the Hungarian prime minister has created a system that depends too much on one person. These systems often fall apart after the dispossession or death of a charismatic leader.
This last bit is the most common criticism of both Tudjman’s rule and that of Orban’s at present.
The need for ‘cultural hegemony’:
Realizing that the conquest and retention of power mainly boils down to the establishment of what Antonio Gramsci called “cultural hegemony,” Orbán came to the same conclusions as Tuđman and began building a parallel intellectual and cultural nucleus that promotes sovereignist thought. He has facilitated this through boosting sympathetic media platforms, but also by supporting new universities (e.g. the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Budapest) and think tanks (e.g. the Danube Institute), which lends intellectual credibility to conservatism. There are examples in recent history of well-known intellectual figures supporting the vision of Eastern European regimes. Czechia had an advocate in Roger Scruton, who personally helped dissidents during communism. Alain Finkielkraut was not fooled by communist myths about “fascist Croats,” and he unequivocally sided with Croatia during the Croatian-Serbian war. Orbán has among his advocates influential intellectuals such as Rod Dreher, Gladden Pappin, John O’Sullivan, and to some extent Jordan Peterson and Patrick Deneen.
An opening:
Orbán’s rule is situated in the broader political context, allowing for the possibility of the kind of global change that could preserve his own political legacy in Hungary. After all, unexpected reversals are possible in several directions. On the one hand, the recent Polish elections, with the pressure of the EU political establishment for a change of government, confirms that even strong conservative governments can be voted out. Without changing the global order, the new Hungarian law on the prohibition of party financing with funds outside Hungary may postpone such a fate, but not prevent it. On the other hand, developments such as the victory of the Eurosceptic political option in the Netherlands show that a change in the wider Western framework in favor of sovereigntist policies is still possible.
The epoch of liberal hegemony—which lasted from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to Putin’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022—is coming to an end. Globalism has begun to collapse with China and Russia’s deliberate self-exclusion from Western politics, and now everything—including Orbán’s vision of the re-traditionalization of the West—is a little more possible than it was yesterday.
The issue of migration and immigration is the best example of how a conservative and/or nationalist regime needs to win every election: a liberal or leftist regime can fling open its borders during the course of its rule to significantly change the demographic balance in the country. A lot of damage can be done in four years.
I had the privilege of living in Switzerland for a year well over a decade ago. Being a very small country and incredibly well-connected through its train system, I got to explore quite a lot and learn even more.
One of the many things that struck me about the country was how every small town and every village had at least one factory engaged in manufacturing. The smaller locales tended to have shops where machine tools were made, a highly-skilled trade. This left me very impressed with the Swiss, as this kind of decentralization and localism appealed to me.
Machine tool production is vital to any industrialized country, as it makes the tools that are necessary to make other things. The USA was once the king of machine tool manufacturing, but it has been in serious decline since the 1980s, as
Machine tools – machines that cut or form metal – are the heart of industrial civilization. Sometimes called “mother machines” (because they’re machines that make other machines), machine tools are required to make almost everything. Nearly every manufactured good is made using machine tools, or by machines which were made using machine tools:
“Thus an automobile is an assembly of metal parts made by machine tools, plastic parts produced by machines made by machine tools, fabric processed on textile machines made by machine tools, rubber processed and molded by equipment made on machine tools, and glass processed by equipment produced by machine tools.” – Anderson Ashburn, Is New Technology Enough?
Being able to manufacture machine tools is often considered an important capability for an industrialized country. Not only does this provide ready access to the latest manufacturing technology, but it ensures production of munitions and other military equipment won’t be bottlenecked by a lack of machine tools. This isn’t a hypothetical concern: American production of artillery shells for Ukraine has been held back by a lack of machine tools. The military has thus historically paid close attention to the machine tool industry and the availability of machinists.
The decline:
For most of the 20th century, the US was unrivaled in its machine tool technology, and as late as the early 1980s it was the largest machine tool producer in the world.. But almost overnight, the industry collapsed: annual machine tool shipments declined by more than 50% in 2 years, hundreds of machine tool companies went out of business, and the US slipped from the largest producer in the world to the 4th or 5th (depending on the year), roughly where it remains today.
What happened?
Click below to read the rest. It’s a fascinating essay.
We end this weekend’s SCR with a busting of a long-held myth: that immigration officials on Ellis Island would change surnames of incoming immigrants:
Most Americans are familiar with the idea that immigrants to the United States during the Ellis Island years (1892–1954) had their surnames altered by the processing officials, either deliberately or through ignorance of the correct spelling. A search of the internet on the phrase “name was changed at Ellis Island” yields more than 300,000 hits; variations on the phrase yield even more. Here is a sampling of recent statements in an online forum asking people whether they believe that such a thing happened:1
My family name was probably shortened from something Eastern European to something German, certainly at Ellis Island.
My great-grandfather came through and the name was shortened and changed by the worker.
Some of my relatives’ surnames were recorded incorrectly on arrival.
My great-grandfather and his two brothers came over together from Lithuania and left Ellis Island with three different last names.
Our Italian surname was changed at Ellis Island when my great-grandparents came over.
If one is to believe these earnest posters, the surnames of immigrants to the United States were routinely treated in a shoddy, unprofessional manner by the government representatives at American ports.
They are wrong.No one’s family name was changed, altered, shortened, butchered, or “written down wrong” at Ellis Island or any American port. That idea is an urban legend.
Many names did get changed as immigrants settled into their new American lives, but those changes were made several years after arrival and were done by choice of someone in the family. The belief persists, however, that the changes were done at the entry point and that the immigrants were unwilling participants in the modifications. Sophisticated family history researchers have long rolled their collective eyes at the “Ellis Island name change” idea. In genealogy blogs and online publications, they wearily repeat the correction—names were not changed at Ellis Island; immigrants changed their own names, usually during the citizenship process. But the belief persists, perhaps because people need to explain surname changes in a way that satisfies them (thinking that their immigrant ancestors made the changes themselves apparently does not do so).
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Fascinating piece about the machine tools industry. Gives credence to the theory that, after being swamped by American military industry during WWII, the Krauts and Japs got their revenge by producing better commercial stuff. (I drive a Mazda and will trade it in for another one, or maybe a Toyota, before some garbage Ford Focus---such is capitalism.)
Relatedly, and more importantly, the return of WWI-style industrial warfare has shocked Pentagon planners. "The Russkies are firing off how many shells per day?!"
"In short, US annual artillery production would at best only last for 10 days to two weeks of combat in Ukraine. If the initial estimate of Russian shells fired is over by 50%, it would only extend the artillery supplied for three weeks."
That's from June last year. The Russkies have ramped up production since, not to mention those supplies from North Korea. And their modern drone-generated telemetry data for artillery strikes makes their WWI generals look like blind duelists. The front is a nightmare for Ukrainian conscripts.
Nevertheless, the USG-WEF-Davos crowd are still telling themselves that Ukraine is prevailing, because Zelenskey remains in power. And the Blackrock et al. contracts to rebuild the place are set and signed. Weirdly, they haven't consulted Russia per these investments...
Click the like button at the top or the bottom of the page to like this entry. Use the share and/or re-stack buttons to share this across social media. Leave a comment if the mood strikes you to do so...and don't forget to subscribe if you haven't done so already.
Fascinating piece about the machine tools industry. Gives credence to the theory that, after being swamped by American military industry during WWII, the Krauts and Japs got their revenge by producing better commercial stuff. (I drive a Mazda and will trade it in for another one, or maybe a Toyota, before some garbage Ford Focus---such is capitalism.)
Relatedly, and more importantly, the return of WWI-style industrial warfare has shocked Pentagon planners. "The Russkies are firing off how many shells per day?!"
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare
"In short, US annual artillery production would at best only last for 10 days to two weeks of combat in Ukraine. If the initial estimate of Russian shells fired is over by 50%, it would only extend the artillery supplied for three weeks."
That's from June last year. The Russkies have ramped up production since, not to mention those supplies from North Korea. And their modern drone-generated telemetry data for artillery strikes makes their WWI generals look like blind duelists. The front is a nightmare for Ukrainian conscripts.
Nevertheless, the USG-WEF-Davos crowd are still telling themselves that Ukraine is prevailing, because Zelenskey remains in power. And the Blackrock et al. contracts to rebuild the place are set and signed. Weirdly, they haven't consulted Russia per these investments...