Saturday Commentary and Review #188 (Easter Monday Edition)
Trump Tariffs As 'Sound Vision, Poor Execution', China, the USA, and the Thucydides Trap, The New Moroccan Empire, Travels in El Salvador, Middle-Aged Japanese Man Trading Cards
Every weekend (almost) I share five articles/essays/reports with you. I select these over the course of the week because they are either insightful, informative, interesting, important, or a combination of the above.
Liberation Day.
On April 2nd, the USA rolled out a new tariff scheme that was applied to friend and foe alike. The reception of these tariffs was met with almost-universal disbelief due to how extreme they were. The usual gang of anti-Trump politicians, thinkers, and scribblers were quick out of the gate to condemn this latest policy rollout. Others (such as myself) decided to take a wait-and-see approach just in case there were some hidden elements that would only come to light later on, certain facts that would make this big move make more sense.
It now looks like there was much less to this rollout than I thought, with the suspension/postponement of tariffs and mixed up/often contradictory public statement from the administration making this clear. The administration came very close to blowing up its own economy and just as close to seizing up a good deal of the world’s trade at the same time. I believe that this is a very obvious conclusion now, with the only possible counter being that this was tactical in pursuit of a longer-term strategy, something that I cannot at present accept as real.
Shock and awe. Shock and awe certainly worked during the First Gulf War, but shock and awe in economic terms can backfire when your domestic economy is exposed to fallout from it. This is precisely what happened, and it is the cleanup from this fallout that will buys this administration for the next few months as it engages in trade negotiations with foreign governments. The British use the term “own goal” for when a soccer player accidentally scores against his own team. This now has all the appearances of a Trump-led own goal.
At the same time, Trump is still to be commended for addressing and trying to act on the fact globalism is no longer working for America and Americans. The bet that the USA placed on China opening up its political system through integration into the global trade regime lost, and instead it was the Chinese who have benefited the most from the architecture erected by America. The USA is now in pursuit of cobbling together a new system of trade, one which can only be a retreat from globalism, as it seeks to use any new arrangement to tame the Chinese by restoring America’s manufacturing base. The vision is sound, but the execution seems to be sorely lacking.
Julius Krein has analyzed the past three weeks of tariff-mania, and in the opinion of this layman his conclusions are sound:
To be sure, the tariffs proceeded from sound motivations. The hollowing out of the U.S. industrial base over the last fifty years is now widely recognized as a major national security and macroeconomic problem, especially after the Covid pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War exposed glaring vulnerabilities in America’s defense industrial base. There is—or at least there was—a broad, bipartisan coalition to address this crisis. Unfortunately, the policies the Trump administration decided to pursue seem confused, and the process by which these measures were determined and implemented has been confusing, to say the least.
I feel that the above excerpt reflects a shared consensus view and won’t find much opposition.
A radical approach:
On April 2, the Trump administration essentially embarked on a crash “decoupling” with multiple trading partners, particularly China, on which tariffs of up to 145 percent have been levied. Under any circumstances, this would be an extremely painful course of action. The costs of tariffs are felt immediately, while any benefits can take years to materialize—the time it takes to construct new production facilities and reconfigure supply chains. In the absence of alternative sources of supply, such massive tariffs will either raise the cost of goods considerably or, in some cases, make their provision entirely uneconomical, leading to shortages and disruptions.
Such economic pain itself makes this approach unlikely to succeed, as many businesses will conclude—correctly, in this case—that aggressive tariffs cannot be sustained politically. Companies will choose to wait out a temporary tariff storm rather than make investments in new supply chains that could take a decade to pay off.
The Trump administration nonetheless voluntarily chose this radical approach, and seems to have done so without any meaningful consultation with industry—including U.S. manufacturers that the measures were supposed to benefit—or political outreach. Minor changes to transportation safety regulations undergo more thorough preparation, vetting, and coalition building than did the largest tariff increase in a century.
Even the most hawkish tariff advocates outside the administration did not propose levying tariffs of this magnitude immediately, and to the extent that industry input was received, it was ignored. Notably absent from the liberation day press conference were any major business leaders as well as prominent Democratic or even Republican endorsements, signaling the policy’s fragility from the start. Indeed, the advice of Elon Musk was reportedly rebuffed, even though Musk, whatever his recent political and personal controversies, is the most successful American manufacturing entrepreneur in living memory.
Like I said above, “shock and awe”. Was this because the President doesn’t have much room elsewhere to try and reorient the economy?
Immediate fallout and walk-back:
Predictably, the reaction of the markets, as well as the general business community, was furious. Stock indices fell more than 10 percent in two days, and companies began scrapping forward earnings guidance and capital spending plans. Notably, Treasuries and the dollar also declined, signaling some level of foreign capital flight. As the turmoil deepened, administration officials waffled between insisting that the tariffs were permanent or merely bargaining chips in a new round of trade “deals.”
One week later, on April 9, the president “postponed” reciprocal tariffs for ninety days on most countries, though raising China tariffs further, admitting that increasing market volatility motivated the decision. On April 12, the administration waived tariffs for all countries on cell phones and various electronic products, promising to announce new sectoral tariffs later. The net result has been to place many U.S. manufacturers, facing higher component costs and working capital issues, at a distinct disadvantage, while the uncertainty generated by so many abrupt policy changes has had a chilling effect on new investment.
Next to profit, business craves nothing more than stability. The initial shock combined with revisions, walk-backs, exemptions, and so on is akin to an earthquake measuring 8.5 on the Richter Scale. How do companies plan for the future if they have no idea what costs will be like from one week to the next?
Building an anti-China coalition:
As of this writing, the administration has pivoted firmly to negotiating new trade deals, and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has stated that his plan is to negotiate with allies first and then approach China “as a group.” This is a sensible strategy, but the last few weeks have severely damaged American credibility and raise doubts about the durability of any deal struck with the Trump administration. Moreover, the administration took a highly combative tone with allies in its first two months over issues ranging from the annexation of Greenland to mocking Canada as the 51st state to publicly inveighing against European speech and election laws.
This is true. Trump’s over-the-top baiting of Canada and Europe hasn’t done him or the USA any favours.
What have we learned?
At this point, it should be clear that a tariff-first strategy for reindustrialization is not going to succeed. Purely “protectionist” measures like tariffs work best when there is a domestic industry to protect. But many critical manufacturing sectors—such as cell phones, ships, consumer drones, processed critical minerals, various electronics components, and many others—are essentially nonexistent in the United States. In addition, certain critical manufacturing machinery and equipment are no longer produced here, so a reindustrializing America would, initially, have to increase imports of such equipment. Even when the domestic industry has not been entirely lost, trade protection without investment support has an uninspiring track record. American political discourse has been uniquely obsessed with tariffs as the first or only tool of industrial development, a fixation that is frequently counterproductive.
White House officials’ more recent statements suggest that they have finally internalized what their actions previously revealed: the liberation day tariffs were a costly mistake. The administration will now have to pull off a series of frantic negotiations just to extricate itself from an economic calamity, despite having already exposed points of weakness that forced a retreat from liberation day.
I am forced to agree with Julius that this entire episode has been “a costly mistake”.
If you’re 45 and above, you will remember how much fear Japan stoked in the hearts of Wall Street in the 1980s when their economy was booming and their exports sector exploding. There were major concerns that the Japanese economy would leap ahead of the USA’s, and that it would result in Japan discarding its constitutional pacifism in order to spread its wings once more throughout the Pacific.
These concerns were no limited to the fringes, they were real. So real were they that respected geopolitical analysts like George Friedman (later of Stratfor) wrote books like these:
The argument was that an upstart like Japan would crash head first into US economic and security interests, sparking another war between the two. This conflict was inevitable because challengers will always seek the crown, and the king will always fight to maintain possession of it.
Suffice it to say that this war did not come to pass. The Japanese threat was vastly overstated, and its economy has been in stagnation-mode for decades now (even though living standards remain very high in relative terms). What may seem inevitable need not be.
The next several years will see marked increase in tension between the USA and China, as the former completes its long awaited “Pivot to East Asia”. So anxious are the Americans to pivot that they have been threatening to “walk away” from Ukraine if they cannot hammer down a peace deal in the very near future. This indicates just how serious a threat they view China’s ascent to be to its economic and security interests. If they are willing to sacrifice more in Ukraine than originally intended, the implication is that China’s rise is a grave concern, and that a clash between the two looks very likely….some would argue that it is inevitable, appealing to a relatively new IR concept called the “Thucydides Trap”.
Andrew Latham explains the concept to us, arguing that Thucydides is misunderstood, making conflict between rising powers and hegemons not necessarily inevitable:
The so-called Thucydides Trap has become a staple of foreign policy commentary over the past decade or so, regularly invoked to frame the escalating rivalry between the United States and China.
Coined by political scientist Graham Allison — first in a 2012 Financial Times article and later developed in his 2017 book “Destined for War” — the phrase refers to a line from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote in his “History of the Peloponnesian War,” “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”
Distortion:
At first glance, this provides a compelling and conveniently packaged analogy: Rising powers provoke anxiety in established ones, leading to conflict. In today’s context, the implication seems clear – China’s rise is bound to provoke a collision with the United States, just as Athens once did with Sparta.
But this framing risks flattening the complexity of Thucydides’ work and distorting its deeper philosophical message. Thucydides wasn’t articulating a deterministic law of geopolitics. He was writing a tragedy.
This essay might be an exercise in historical sperging, but I think it has value:
Thucydides fought in the Peloponnesian War on the Athenian side. His world was steeped in the sensibilities of Greek tragedy, and his historical narrative carries that imprint throughout. His work is not a treatise on structural inevitability but an exploration of how human frailty, political misjudgment and moral decay can combine to unleash catastrophe.
That tragic sensibility matters. Where modern analysts often search for predictive patterns and system-level explanations, Thucydides drew attention to the role of choice, perception and emotion.
His history is filled with the corrosive effects of fear, the seductions of ambition, the failures of leadership and the tragic unraveling of judgment. This is a study in hubris and nemesis, not structural determinism.
Much of this is lost when the phrase “Thucydides Trap” is elevated into a kind of quasi-law of international politics. It becomes shorthand for inevitability: power rises, fear responds, war follows.
Therefore, more of a psychological study of characters rather than structural determinism.
Giving credit to Allison:
Even Allison, to his credit, never claimed the “trap” was inescapable. His core argument was that war is likely but not inevitable when a rising power challenges a dominant one. In fact, much of Allison’s writing serves as a warning to break from the pattern, not to resign oneself to it.
Misuse:
In that sense, the “Thucydides Trap” has been misused by commentators and policymakers alike. Some treat it as confirmation that war is baked into the structure of power transitions — an excuse to raise defense budgets or to talk tough with Beijing — when in fact, it ought to provoke reflection and restraint.
To read Thucydides carefully is to see that the Peloponnesian War was not solely about a shifting balance of power. It was also about pride, misjudgment and the failure to lead wisely.
Consider his famous observation, “Ignorance is bold and knowledge reserved.” This isn’t a structural insight — it’s a human one. It’s aimed squarely at those who mistake impulse for strategy and swagger for strength.
Or take his chilling formulation, “The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.” That’s not an endorsement of realpolitik. It’s a tragic lament on what happens when power becomes unaccountable and justice is cast aside.
and
In today’s context, invoking the Thucydides Trap as a justification for confrontation with China may do more harm than good. It reinforces the notion that conflict is already on the rails and cannot be stopped.
But if there is a lesson in “The History of the Peloponnesian War,” it is not that war is inevitable but that it becomes likely when the space for prudence and reflection collapses under the weight of fear and pride.
Thucydides offers not a theory of international politics but a warning — an admonition to leaders who, gripped by their own narratives, drive their nations over a cliff.
Latham does have a point, but events have a momentum all their own, and they are often hard to stop. Inevitabilities do exist, such as Israel and Hezbollah entering into conflict with one another in 2022 after their 2006 war saw the latter come out with a tactical victory. Barring a black swan event, the USA and China are headed for a collision. The question is: in what form?
One hugely important story that I have not covered enough on this Substack is the collapse of French influence in West and Northwest Africa. The story of Algeria is well-known, but that took place more than half a century ago. In the past decade, French military forces have been evicted from several countries, creating a vacuum that is being filled by other powers. Russia has been very active in the region, as has Turkey, the UAE, and China (albeit only economically).
During the Great War on Terror (GWOT), this region saw more coverage due to the presence of al-Qaida franchises in places like Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. As that conflict tapered off, so too did interest in this part of Africa. This hiatus in western media interest lasted until the French found themselves becoming persona non grata in several countries that were once its colonies. France is on the retreat in West and Northwest Africa. It does have a backup plan though; working with Morocco to become its successor by way of establishing it as the regional hegemon. Such an outcome would permit the French to retain some presence in its former colonial holdings, and not be completely shut out, a condition that cannot be discounted at present.
I came across this long entry on Morocco’s push for power in Northwestern Africa, and I learned quite a bit from it. I cannot judge how accurate the portrayal is, but it definitely is worth a read for those of you interested as to what is going on in that part of Africa.
Until recently, Morocco was geographically isolated in northwest Africa, sharing land borders only with Algeria to the east and the vast, mostly ungoverned Sahara to the south. Persistent tensions with Algeria have led to repeated border closures, leaving Morocco with just one overland connection to the rest of Africa: south through the disputed Western Sahara region via Mauritania. Morocco considers Western Sahara an integral part of its territory and has administered most of the region since Spain’s withdrawal from its former colony in 1975.
The Polisario Front, an insurgent group claiming to represent the Sahrawi people native to Western Sahara, have long sought independence, and since 1975, Polisario has waged an intermittent war against Morocco, allegedly with varying degrees of military, financial, and diplomatic support from Algeria, Libya, Cuba, and Iran. International monitors estimate that this multi-decade war has resulted in 10,000-to-20,000 casualties among combatants and civilians.
As part of its counterinsurgency efforts, Morocco has constructed the Berm, a 2,700-kilometre-long "sand wall" manned by 100,000 soldiers stationed in a series of military outposts. This defensive line stretches from the Algerian border to the Atlantic, effectively serving as Morocco’s de facto southern boundary. The Berm creates a slight separation between Mauritania and Western Sahara (and thus Morocco), leaving a stretch of largely uninhabited territory known as No Man’s Land. Due to extensive minefields and the absence of permanent settlements, this area has historically prevented direct border access between Morocco and Mauritania.
That’s a very long wall!
Change:
This is changing. The Guerguerat border post, once a remote checkpoint between Mauritania and Morocco separated by No Man’s Land, is now being transformed into a fully operational international crossing with the necessary infrastructure. It has become a crucial node in Morocco’s trade network with sub-Saharan Africa, facilitating over $1 billion in annual exports, roughly 2% of Morocco’s total exports, primarily agricultural and industrial goods.
The Guerguerat and Smara-Bir Moghrein crossings represent more than logistical improvements. By establishing direct corridors with Mauritania and its resource-rich interior, abundant in iron, copper, and oil, to Moroccan Atlantic ports like Laayoune, this infrastructure will further integrate Mauritania into Morocco’s export-driven economy and enable access to the rest of Africa to participate in this expanding economic zone. Given Morocco’s industrial ambitions, which demand substantial natural resources, this development marks a new phase in Rabat’s long-term geopolitical strategy to position itself as Africa’s primary economic gateway to the Atlantic, Europe, and beyond.
In doing so, Morocco hopes to establish itself as a regional hegemon that can outmanoeuvre its historical rival, Algeria, and replace waning French influence in West Africa. But Morocco faces stiff competition. As France’s influence wanes amid diplomatic setbacks, and Russia’s engagements in Mali and elsewhere face growing scrutiny over war crimes and other abuses, a power vacuum has emerged across West Africa.
New actors, including Turkiye, Iran, China, and the Gulf Arab States, are vying to fill the void. Even so, Morocco stands out as the most geographically proximate, politically stable, and economically coherent contender, with a thousand-year history of cultural and imperial dominance covering much of the region. Unlike external powers, Morocco is playing a long game, one it has been preparing for over two decades under King Mohammed VI (MVI), who ascended the Moroccan throne in 1999.
Morocco sees Algeria as its main challenger, but not its only one.
France outsourcing its role to Morocco:
Morocco’s economic and diplomatic expansion into West Africa is not rivalrous towards France, but instead part of a process of France “outsourcing” the management of its Françafrique sphere of influence to Morocco. France’s attempt to maintain the post-colonial status quo in the region has resulted in diminishing returns over time, and Morocco has positioned itself to take advantage of the moment when France could no longer maintain that status quo and sought new partners to take over this process.
Since ascending to the throne in 1999, MVI has systematically cultivated Morocco’s ties with West African nations through a combination of high-level diplomacy and strategic economic investments that would eventually position Morocco to replace French influence in West Africa. His frequent visits to Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Côte d’Ivoire have yielded numerous cooperation agreements spanning trade, security, and infrastructure development. These partnerships form the backbone of Morocco’s ambitious vision to position itself as the primary economic and logistical conduit between Africa and Europe.
At the heart of this strategy lies the Al Mada investment fund, the royal family’s financial arm that functions as Morocco’s de facto sovereign wealth fund. Through Al Mada, Moroccan businesses have aggressively expanded into West African markets, particularly in banking, insurance, telecommunications, and construction, seeking to replace French influence across the region.
Competition (long excerpt, apologies):
France’s historical influence in West Africa dramatically declined, with a broad military retreat occurring across the region as military juntas take over Sahel nations one by one. This has opened up opportunities for Morocco, once colonised by France along with the rest of Africa, to fill the void. However, Morocco is not the sole actor vying for influence in West Africa. Regional neighbours such as Algeria and international powers, including Russia, Turkiye, China, and the UAE, have similarly intensified their presence, each advancing distinct strategic agendas.
Guided by a decades-old Soviet-era ‘Africa policy’ and President Vladimir Putin’s ambition, Russia has capitalised on rising anti-Western (particularly anti-French) sentiment in West Africa to become the foremost military power in the region. Through support for military juntas, including those of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad (as well as seeking to expand their footprint in eastern Libya and Sudan), and fourth-generation warfare tactics such as disinformation campaigns and propaganda, Russia has significantly eroded French influence. However, Russia too has seen its soft power in the region take significant blows, not least because of the actions of paramilitary organisations like the Wagner Group, which has operated in Mali as an extension of the Kremlin. Under the pretext of security contracts, the group has also engaged in the illegal extraction of gold reserves and stands accused of numerous human rights violations and massacres against civilians.
Algeria, historically aligned with Russia and something of an archnemesis to Morocco, has conducted joint military exercises with the Russians near Morocco’s border. However, since the Ukraine conflict began, Algeria has cautiously distanced itself from Moscow, citing Russia’s diminished arms export capacity and its reluctance to commit to overt military alliances. Nonetheless, both nations continued to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria until its collapse in December 2024. Algeria also defied the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) by acquiring Russian-made Su-57 fighter jets, prompting US Senator Marco Rubio to propose sanctions in 2022.
Algeria, for its part, has long relied on proxy warfare to extend its influence, backing separatist movements such as the Polisario Front in Morocco and the Azawad Front in Mali. Leaked diplomatic cables suggest that after the 2012 Tamanrasset terrorist attack, Algerian authorities struck tacit agreements with AQIM, redirecting threats towards Moroccan and French interests in exchange for sparing Algerian assets. This alleged cooperation has reportedly led to the deaths of at least three Moroccan nationals in Mali over the past decade.
Iran’s role in West Africa, though understated, is multifaceted and expanding. Since the 1990s, Tehran has promoted Shia proselytisation in a region historically dominated by Sufi Islam. Nigeria now hosts a larger Shia population than Lebanon, with groups like the Islamic Movement, modelled on Iran’s revolutionary system, advocating for a Shia Islamic republic. Iran and Hezbollah have also allegedly supported the Polisario Front since 2018, supplying training and short-range missiles to fighters in Tindouf. Reports even suggest Polisario troops participated in Syria’s civil war alongside Iranian-backed militias.
China’s involvement, by contrast, is primarily economic. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing focuses on securing raw materials and funding infrastructure, such as Mauritania’s Nouakchott deep-water port and Guinea’s Djibloho Dam, while establishing logistics networks for mineral extraction.
Turkiye has also grown assertive, selling drones to Mali, including the model downed by Algeria, and backing Libya’s Tripoli-based government. Ankara’s plans to open military bases in southern Libya, near Algeria’s border, signal a deepening engagement across Africa.
The UAE has likewise emerged as a pivotal player, cultivating ties with the Sahel military juntas, facilitating Mali’s gold exports, and processing Guinea’s bauxite into aluminium in Emirati facilities. It maintains naval access agreements with Mauritania and robust investment links with Morocco, though relations with Algeria remain strained due to competing regional ambitions.
A scramble for Northwestern Africa?
More challenges:
However, Morocco faces numerous challenges in doing so. Terrorism is on the rise across the Sahel as the French military retreat, Russian paramilitary war crimes, and weak state capacity have allowed groups like Al-Qaeda to occupy territory. Powers further afield like Russia, China, Turkiye, the UAE, and Iran are also seeking to take advantage of the state of chaos across Africa.
Perhaps most importantly, ordinary citizens in Morocco are not reaping the rewards as the country suffers from high and persistent unemployment and low wages. The Makzhen, Morocco’s political and economic elite, and particularly the royal family through the Al Mada fund, reap the lion’s share of rewards through the acquisition of French assets and new business links across Africa. As King MVI looks across West Africa and sees an opportunity to restore Morocco’s historical position of primacy in the region, he may yet be forced to contend with issues closer to home, like fixing Morocco’s political economy.
It’s interesting to note that despite the French retreat from the region and the increasing Russian and Chinese presence there, the USA has not made too much noise in response.
El Salvador is in the news these days, and it’s all thanks to that incredible one-man news generator, Donald Trump. We’ll discuss the issue of deporting people to El Salvador in the future, but for now I want to share this travelogue from an actual Salvadoran who was born and resides in Southern California. She has spent quite a bit of time there in the past and recent past, and finds that there is a bit of a disconnect between what foreigners imagine the place to be since Bukele arrived on the scene and what it is actually like.
This is written in a loose style, adding a very personal touch:
We had an Uber driver who was from Austin, TX. I couldn’t remember if he was Salvadoran-born or not. I didn’t want to press but tried to decipher from his story-telling if he had been deported, or just wanted to live in El Salvador. “Self-deported,” something I joke about on X but at the same time I am somewhat serious about it, especially more so as we drove along the breathtaking coastline of La Libertad.
I told him that I had some family in Soyapango and his eyes widened. “There used to be tons of gang members there,” he said.
He mentioned that a few years back, the police used to harass him about his tattoos. Now, not anymore.
We made it to El Zonte, which was now rebranded as Bitcoin Beach. We were told to meet the rest of the group at the Bitcoin Farmer’s Market. It looked like it was ending, but I guess I thought that because there weren’t too many people around. The farmer’s market had the strangest version of hippies that I’d never seen before. They reminded me of the type of hippie that’s like an aspiring Buddhist yogi who ventures off to Thailand to find themselves. But this kind of hippie is weirder. The God is Bitcoin. Manifesting Bitcoin. The Vibes of Bitcoin. At the farmer’s market, you only pay in Bitcoin. There was a coffee bar. A couple of Salvadoran ladies selling honey. An Eritrean/Ethiopian food stand. Baked goods with no seed oils. Crystals and jewelry. It was very hot and I was very thirsty, but no one seemed to be selling water, and that was all I wanted. Behind me, I noticed a small creature in a box. It was a sweet little tuxedo kitten.
Click here to read the rest.
Leave it to the Japanese to be charmingly weird.
We end this Easter Monday’s SCR with a story about how one Japanese town is experiencing a craze in ‘Middle-Aged Man Trading Cards’:
In the small town of Kawara in Fukuoka Prefecture, something unexpected is happening at the Saidosho Community Center. While kids in most parts of Japan are obsessed with Pokémon cards — or perhaps the franchise’s latest smartphone game, Pokémon TCG Pocket — the children of Kawara are clutching to something a little closer to home.
They are playing a trading card game (TCG) where the stars aren’t fantasy creatures, anime heroes or even famous baseball players, but ojisan (middle-aged or older men) from the local community of Saidosho.
Click here to read the rest.
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I don’t agree with your first excerpt that there is or was a “broad, bipartisan support” for ending or reducing strategic reliance on China. Aside from a few one-off photo-op type announcements - a chip fab in Arizona, etc - no one aside from Trump has offered any kind of macro-economic policy that would enable a broad manufacturing recovery.
Despite the erratic and severe nature of Trump’s announcements, I have yet to hear any of his critics offer an alternative proposal that would accomplish anything similar. There aren’t too many levers to pull to reduce America’s gargantuan twin deficits (fiscal and trade), the choices are effectively: 1) tariffs, or 2) European-style middle class taxes. Both of them quite painful, both politically harmful. I predict that for all the caterwauling about Trump’s “stupidity” etc, his critics will offer no alternatives and we will continue sailing blithely towards the cliff.
An economy as unbalanced as America’s cannot continue indefinitely; it will adjust through policy or markets will force an adjustment on it. As anyone familiar with historical market-induced adjustments knows, the latter is invariably more painful than the former, albeit requiring much less political courage.